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失敗の本質: 日本軍の組織論的研究 (中公文庫と 18-1) 文庫 – ノート, 1991/8/1

戸部良一 (著), 寺本義也 (著), 鎌田伸一 (著),

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ISBN-13

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中央公論新社
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言語

日本語
本の長さ

413ページ
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	失敗の本質―日本軍の組織論的研究	昭和16年夏の敗戦―新版	組織の盛衰―決定版

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内容説明	日本的組織論・戦略論の名著。大東亜戦争での諸作戦の失敗を、組織としての日本軍の失敗ととらえ直し、これを現代の組織一般にとっての教訓とした戦史の初めての社会科学的分析	日米開戦前夜、四年後の敗戦は正確に予言されていた！平均年齢33歳、「総力戦研究所」の若きエリート集団が出した結論は「日本必敗」。それでもなお開戦へと突き進んだのはなぜか？	歴史作家であり、稀代のプロデューサーでもあった著者の二十年以上にわたる組織論研究の集大成。著者解説「今こそ、読んでほしい作品」を収録した決定版！

登録情報

ASIN ‏ : ‎ 4122018331
出版社 ‏ : ‎ 中央公論新社 (1991/8/1)
発売日 ‏ : ‎ 1991/8/1
言語 ‏ : ‎ 日本語
文庫 ‏ : ‎ 413ページ
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 9784122018334
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-4122018334

Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: - 709位本 (本の売れ筋ランキングを見る)
- - 3位戦略・戦術
- - 7位中公文庫
- - 92位経営学・キャリア・MBA

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戸部良一

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マルチビタミン

【目次がなかったので】

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名著なのに目次が見当たらなかったので。

目次
はしがき
序章日本軍の失敗から何を学ぶか
本書のねらい
本書のアプローチと構成

１章失敗の事例研究
１ノモンハン事件――失敗の序曲
プロローグ
第一次ノモンハン事件
第二次ノモンハン事件
タムスク爆撃
ハルハ河渡河作戦
砲兵戦
｢事件処理要綱」
持久防禦
ソ連軍の八月攻勢
アナリシス

２ミッドウェー作戦――海戦のターニング・ポイント
プロローグ
作戦の目的とシナリオ
日本海軍の戦略思想
ミッドウェー作戦の目的とシナリオ
米海軍のシナリオ
海戦の経過
序幕――索敵の開始
第一機動部隊VS.ミッドウェー航空基地
南雲司令長官の意思決定
フレッチャーとスプルーアンスの意思決定
加賀、赤城、蒼龍の被弾
山口司令官の意思決定
閉幕――全空母喪失と作戦の中止
アナリシス
後知恵と錯誤
連合艦隊司令部の錯誤
第一機動部隊の錯誤
日本海軍の戦略・用兵思想

３ガダルカナル作戦――陸戦のターニング・ポイント
プロローグ
作戦の経過
一木支隊急行
第一回総攻撃
第二回総攻撃
撤退
アナリシス
戦略的グランド・デザインの欠如
攻勢終末点の逸脱
統合作戦の欠如
第一線部隊の自律性抑圧と情報フィードバックの欠如

４インパール作戦――賭の失敗
プロローグ
作戦構想
東部インド進攻作戦構想
ビルマ情勢の変化
牟田口のインド進攻構想
作戦計画決定の経緯
作戦目的および計画をめぐる対立
大本営の認可
作戦の準備と実施
鵯越戦法
作戦の準備
作戦の発動
作戦の実施と中止
アナリシス

５レイテ海戦――自己認識の失敗
プロローグ
捷一号作戦計画の策定経過
サイパン島陥落後
連合艦隊の捷号作戦要領
マニラでの作戦打合せ
捷号作戦計画策定後の状況推移
ダバオ誤報事件とその余波
沖縄空襲
台湾沖航空戦
捷一号作戦の展開――レイテ海戦
捷一号作戦発動
レイテ湾突入計画
ブルネイ出撃
栗田艦隊「反転」
アナリシス
作戦目的・任務の錯誤
戦略的不適応
情報・通信システムの不備
高度の平凡性の欠如

６沖縄戦――終局段階での失敗
プロローグ
沖繩作戦の準備段階
第三二軍の創設
台北会議
第九師団の抽出と配備変更
第八四師団派遣の内示と中止
作戦の実施
沖縄作戦初動の航空作戦
米軍上陸
北・中飛行場喪失に対する反響
第三二軍司令部の内部論争
アナリシス

２章失敗の本質――戦略・組織における日本軍の失敗の分析
六つの作戦に共通する性格
戦略上の失敗要因分析
あいまいな戦略目的
短期決戦の戦略志向
主観的で「帰納的」な戦略策定――空気の支配
狭くて進化のない戦略オプション
アンバランスな戦闘技術体系
組織上の失敗要因分析
人的ネットワーク偏重の組織構造
属人的な組織の統合
学習を軽視した組織
プロセスや動機を重視した評価
要約

３章失敗の教訓――日本軍の失敗の本質と今日的課題
軍事組織の環境適応
日本軍の環境適応
戦略・戦術
資源
組織特性
組織学習
組織文化
自己革新組織の原則と日本軍の失敗
不均衡の創造
自律性の確保
創造的破壊による突出
異端・偶然との共存
知識の淘汰と蓄積
統合的価値の共有
日本軍の失敗の本質とその連続性

参考文献

139人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています

役に立った

Mr.ヨシム

先人による現代人の為の教訓は歴史に有り

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具体的な失敗事例を解りやすく解説しており史実自体を客観的視点から自然に私観へ誘導してくれる書籍だと思う。

1人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています

役に立った

Amazon カスタマー

読みたかった本でした。

2024年3月1日に日本でレビュー済み

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非常に廉価で入手できました。参考文献として役に立ちました。

2人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています

役に立った

marina denai rey

In hindsight everything is 20/20 but ESSENCE

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I remember that the book was highly acclaimed among certain business circles in Tokyo around when the collapse of Bubble-Economy coincided with the 50th anniversary of Japan's unconditional surrender in WWII. Then, I was not interested.

Below, at the risk of committing a Monday-morning-quarterbacking, is my review after reading it now.

-They discuss the subject, in detail, through the prism of business/management academic thinking in a prototypical format, seen in such vehicles as XX Business Review; a) fact-finding, b) problem-identification, c) analysis, d) remedies/recommended plan of actions. Thus, readers can learn the standard academic approach in this field in addition to pertinent terminology and analytical concepts.

A beautifully composed scholarly work, different from ubiquitous business literatures connecting everything to casual management theories marketed by the same and similar publishers.

-Ample collection of empirical data/information and reference to some renowned sources, writings and books, regarding ill-fated, most infamous, major military operations during the last War would certainly be beneficial and recommendable to novice readers, in particular, among younger generations.

With all due respect, however, I felt concerned about the following;

1) Most of the weakness/errors identified, both organizational and tactical, regarding the Imperial Japanese Militaries in addition to the factual information in Chapter 1 had already been extensively discussed and well established prior to its first publication in 1984 by a number of historians/military experts/former officers, etc., including, among others, a bright Naval Academy-educated captain, who struggled to make any sense out of his imminent death on the deck of Battleship Yamato, an epitome of the leadership's inability to foresee a technological/strategic paradigm shift, heading to a nonsensical suicide mission in Okinawan Sea that is in essence an outright write-off of two precious assets still left in an empire on the brink, specifically by far the most expensive non-performing asset and thousands of promising young minds, for nothing.

2) It is no surprise that plentiful of 'kata-kana' technical terms and concepts presented with graphs/matrix, such as 'Grand Design', 'Contingency Plan', 'Incrementalism', 'Integration' etc., might have reflected as eye-opening and even mesmerizing to those earnest Japanese business people who were at loss after witnessing an epic fall of their economy along with much celebrated Japanese Management Theories.

Rather than detecting new problems or dissecting/probing underlying causes, however, these tools were used as instruments for the purpose of defining/categorizing pre-discovered symptoms within the conceptual framework of contemporary business/management studies, and then navigating readers to a set of textbook recipe for success according to the theories of U.S. origin, represented by 'Organizational Learning', 'Drawing Grand Design', 'Long-term Strategic Thinking', 'Matching Organization and Strategy', etc., such academic norms as we can find in classics by Alfred D Chandler, Jay W Lorsch and the others.

Plausible/Comprehensive an image as it might project, this synthetic flow seems a bit overstretching and too ambitious exercise. Assuming that A and B are independently valid on each premise, incorporating A into B to suit them to a premeditated proposition does not necessarily constitute persuasive/coherent arguments. It is tempting and yet tends to be methodologically compromising as well as conflated. Ironically, this approach seems exactly as deductive as how the authors claim that the Imperial Army were liable to be.

3) In highlighting the limitations of Japanese Military Organizations in terms of strategic time horizon, flexibility/responsiveness in operational management, transparency/fairness in personnel appraisal system, considerations to logistics/resources management, etc., the authors, diligent students of modern social sciences, naturally contrast them with American Militaries and, by extension, American corporations, the good guys. A snap-shot comparison on manifested symptoms with little reference to the difference in historical context of two parties, however, seems rather misleading in exploring root causes of diseases.

Imperial Militaries, essentially a most indoctrinated political-military entity at core since the mid-1920s, were free from any effective oversight shielded by the Emperor's 'Tousuiken', or Supreme Commanding Rights. Accordingly they, in particular those elite staff officers at General Headquarters who crafted/choreographed disastrous strategies/tactical operations, were rarely held accountable for the consequences during and even after the War. Being prisoners of the glorified institutional legacy, those technocrats saw little incentives but keep investing in outdated strategies/tactics set out to by their superiors 30-40 years earlier and serving to the tribal agendas in order to advance their own careers in a tightly-knitted 'group-thinking' bureaucracy.

As typical of unchecked bureaucracies, one of the main goals, particularly after the traumatic Disarmament Period, had been to keep its primacy within the country's power structure, which necessitated perpetual wars to justify their ballooning budgets and growing number of general/high-ranking officer corps, no matter whether each operation was necessary/effective or how many soldiers lives be expended. Some argue that intra-military rivalry between Army and Navy for larger budgets contributed much to triggering and expanding conflicts in China, paving a way to the fatal strategic blunders; Army's marching into French-occupied northern Indo-China in 1940 and ultimately, Navy's Pearl Harbor in the following year.

On the other hand, U.S. Militaries were, by definition, under the leadership of democratically-elected President as Commander-In-Chief, and therefore, were subjected to more public scrutiny. They, relatively young as joint forces, had yet to earn public trust. In addition, majority of American citizens had remained, prior to Pearl Harbor, skeptical about their involvements in overseas conflicts beyond the sphere of influence defined by Monroe Doctrine, which is proven in the plight of Wilsonianism after WWI. They witnessed how harshly WWI veterans were treated by the Governments in Washington during Great Depression, most notably in the crash of The Bonus Army protest in 1932. A blunt description by Smedley Butler, the most decorated marine, 'War is a Racket', still lingered in their minds.

These contextual constraints seem to have played major roles in compelling them and FDR to pursue more cost-conscious, specifically in containing soldiers casualty figures/result-oriented options in both strategic formulation and organizational designing, guiding them to more restrained/rational tactical planning and execution. We cannot discuss organizational behaviors with little regard to external factors and circumstances in perspective.

By the same token, I am curious to know to what extent the authors could apply the same yardsticks in accurately diagnosing the demise of German Militaries during the same period. They were reputed to be organized with modern scientific minds, rigid chain of command, legendary sense of strict compliance/discipline, and keen eyes on efficient logistics/operation management under a clear grand design, the key success factors according to the authors, albeit for nefarious purposes. Did victorious Red Army have more advanced, American-style, thinking in areas of organizational design/strategic formulation? How about People's Liberation Army vs Imperial Army for that matter?

4) Thanks to the unfair time advantage, we now know that with progression of Cold War much-appraised U.S. militaries have lost their edge and become increasingly more comparable to the Japanese peers during WWII, characterized by blind hubris, doubling down of failed pretext with no reverse gear, denial of reality, messianic sense of mission, etc., evident in such asymmetrical wars as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and more. They lately admitted that a significant portion of their gigantic budgets remain unaccounted for over the years.

These growing maladies coincide with ever-increasing influences of Military-Industrial-Complex, which was first warned against by President Eisenhower in 1961 and has continued to grow and dominate every spectrum of the Establishment encompassing Media and Acamedia to play a similar function as did the Emperor's Tousuiken. They never allow any political/military leaders to acknowledge/respond in a timely manner, much less to consider a sunk-cost approach, of which they had managed to learn for a brief period after the Vietnam debacle, to inconvenient defeats/failures at either battle or strategic fronts. Their priority lies in preserving self-serving narratives to keep enjoying lucrative captive markets. It is symbolically interesting that Robert S McNamara, one of 'the Best and the Brightest' who as a young Business-School graduate played an instrumental role in an 'efficient' Strategic Bombing Campaign during WWII and later turned around ailing Ford Motor Company by introducing 'scientific management system', eventually led the country to the deep quagmire in Vietnam as Defense Secretary in the 1960s.

5) For all the advanced theories in business/management fields and plentiful of rhetoric on 'excellent companies', American corporations have never been reputed for long-term perspectives, but instead have always been under criticism for its myopic orientation dictated by the shareholders' interests specifically focused on current bottom-lines and share prices. In the past decades, few companies have shown their strengths in terms of organizational/strategic thinking in face of tough competitions from Japan, and more recently from China.

As a result, de-industrialization and hollowing of domestic economy, once controversial issues among business journalism, are now fait accompli. Only a limited number of corporations privileged with size and resources have benefited and thrived in deregulated and financialized environments through consolidation, restructuring, and outsourcing to foreign countries, thereby eliminating competition/slashing overheads/maximizing profit margins, also aided by geopolitical power of their own governments in establishing rules/infrastructures of 'globalization' and 'privatization' in overseas markets to their advantage.

Periodic financial crises, unavoidable by-product of debt-driven economy, in the past decades were only rescued by their manifested archrivals, namely Japan in the 1980-90s and China in the 2000s. Unfortunately, they would not locate any white knight available in the coming crisis because they successfully destroyed the former and alienated the latter so much for their own hegemonical aspirations.

6) It is more remarkable to see the transitions of the Japanese companies and the environments since the book's first publication in 1984 when Japanese economy was on a long-term upward trajectory and their management systems were discussed with much fanfare in the U.S. business academic communities, exemplified by a book ostensibly titled 'Theory Z'. Flights to Tokyo were packed with top executives from both Wall Street and Main Street calling on Japanese institutions to solicit for emergency funds while in Washington politicians were busy hammering Japanese cars and consumer electrical products into pieces in front of local workforces frustrated with 'unfair' trade practices of the overseas competition.

Then came Plaza Accord in 1985 which reversed the course of the whole economy. The Bubble-Economy caused by easy money policy with an intention of financing the dual deficits of U.S. economy and its inevitable crash in early 1990s followed by the tight monetary policies coupled with austerity measures during the aftermath were beyond what any ingenuities of independent companies could cope with.

Subsequent series of capitulations to U.S. pressures, during the post-Cold War environment, at policy-making level in trade/structural impediments negotiations, deregulation, privatizations in public sectors in the name of 'reforms' by successive administrations did not do much good to Japanese companies. As of today, scattered with 'too-big-to-fail' legacy companies on life support, our economy has been, in average, the least-growing with by far the highest Debt/GDP ratio among major developed countries for decades, which is only sustained by decade-long 'unprecedented' lax monetary policy, intentionally harming its own currency, with no viable option otherwise.

No wonder economists in other countries sarcastically call it, 'the Second Economic Miracle of Japan'. The honorable title, 'the Greatest Threat to US Economy', once bestowed upon us in the 1980-90s has been in possession of China for long now. This time again, no one directly responsible for the major policy blunders including, among others, those masterminding mandarins and politically-appointed economic advisors, has been held accountable for the 'Lost Decades'.

7) Learning from failure is easier to be said than done. Anyone is free to extract whatever message he/she chooses. Given that all the suggestions in Chapter 3 were correct, however, I wonder why the Japanese companies and its economy as a whole have had to embrace such successive defeats for several decades since this book was first published and widely read among earnest individuals in corporate community? What hindered those at the helm from adopting necessary measures? If some prescient leaders had indeed implemented prescribed remedies, why did they not work out? Were the organizational issues discussed here just one of the variables among many others or even truism? Weren't there any other more significant and/or systemic problems inherent in this society which have survived the national disaster 80 years ago and/or the other sets of solution available from a broader perspective?

-The book title was apparently from Graham T Allison's 'Essence of Decision', an essential in decision-making studies, which analyzed decision-making process of both JFK's and Kremlin's during Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Whether this book is up to the audacious title, I am not certain. I am only reminded of Alexis de Tocqueville's words quoted at the top of Allison's book that is concerning men of letters vs practitioners writing history; the former are always inclined to find general causes, while the latter to imagine that everything is attributable to particular incidents. Both are to be presumed equally deceived.

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2024年2月15日に日本でレビュー済み

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戦争の中の、１つ１つの戦闘を切り取りその戦略やコミュニケーションにどのような失敗があったかを教えてくれて、今の組織論にも通じるところが多くあります。戦争に関する予備知識が少し必要なため、戦争に興味や関心がないと少し難しい本かもしれません。

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岩尾

人からの紹介で手に取った本だったが。期待以上だった

2023年11月6日に日本でレビュー済み

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特に、企業経営に携わっている方に是非読んで貰いたい一冊。

経営のノウハウ本ではないので、この本から手法などは学べないが、
経営戦略・組織形成を考える際の基本的な考え方といった点で、自身参考になった。
ただどこまで合理的に実行できるかは、中々難しいとは思うが。

2人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています

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岸原孝昌

日本人のエートスは変わってない。

2023年11月5日に日本でレビュー済み

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現代に通じる提言が多々ありますが、失敗を誘引した日本人のエートス（簡単に変えられない行為態度・心の習慣）は変わっていないことに驚きました。
失敗の本質とされたのは、逆説的ですが「日本軍は環境に適応しすぎて失敗した」ということでした。
「適応は適応能力を締め出す」古い体制・考えのまま究極まで最適化（完璧主義）して成果を出すことで、変化する環境に適応するために必要な自己革新ができずに失敗するという行為態度は、現代の日本を見ているようです。
「日本人の完璧主義がイノベーションを阻害するため成長しない」等々がいわれてますが、じゃ簡単に変えられないものをどうやって変えるのか？
次は「〈心の習慣〉を陶冶する〈社会構造〉の設計」というアイディアを提示したタルコット・パーソンズ「社会的行為の構造」を読んでみたいと思います。

11人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています

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konyy3

読みやすくて深い

2023年9月23日に日本でレビュー済み

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内容が戦例に応じて記述されており、かつ我々の現代における組織的特性と合致された内容となっており、理解しやすい内容となっている。
コレからの組織運営へ反映できる内容、そして若干古く思える教訓であっても重要性は未だ色褪せない鮮明さが際立つ。
企業の運営には欠かせないバイブル

2人のお客様がこれが役に立ったと考えています

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